Longlisted for the PEN/E.O. Wilson Literary Science Writing Award A leading neuroscientist offers a history of the evolution of the brain from unicellular organisms to the complexity of animals and human beings today Renowned neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux digs into the natural history of life on earth to provide a new perspective on the similarities between us and our ancestors in deep time. This page-turning survey of the whole of terrestrial evolution sheds new light on how nervous systems evolved in (...) animals, how the brain developed, and what it means to be human. In The Deep History of Ourselves, LeDoux argues that the key to understanding human behavior lies in viewing evolution through the prism of the first living organisms. By tracking the chain of the evolutionary timeline he shows how even the earliest single-cell organisms had to solve the same problems we and our cells have to solve each day. Along the way, LeDoux explores our place in nature, how the evolution of nervous systems enhanced the ability of organisms to survive and thrive, and how the emergence of what we humans understand as consciousness made our greatest and most horrendous achievements as a species possible. (shrink)

One of the main functions that introductory chemistry courses have fulfilled during the past century has been to provide evidence for the general validity of 'the atomic hypothesis.' A second function has been to demonstrate that an analytical approach has wide applicability in rationalizing many kinds of phenomena. Following R.G. Collingwood, these two functions can be recognized as related to a philosophical 'cosmology' (worldview, weltanshauung) that became dominant in the later Renaissance. Recent developments in many areas of science, and in (...) chemistry, have emphasized the central importance of understanding synthetic, developmental, and evolutionary aspects of nature. This paper argues that these scientific developments, and changes in other aspects of culture, amount to a widespread shift to an alternative cosmology, a quite different general worldview. To the extent that this is the case, introductory chemistry courses ought to be changed in fundamental ways. Rather that having a main focus on analysis to microscopic components, introductory chemistry instruction should emphasize current scientific understanding of the (synthetic) evolutionary origins of the present world. This altered approach would provide good preparation for future professional work, while also making better contact with the perceived concerns of students. (shrink)

How certain neural mechanisms momentarily endow with the subjective awareness percepts and affects represented elsewhere is more likely to be clarified when structures essential to Mc are identified. The loss of C with bilateral thalmic lesions involving the intralaminar nuclei contrasts with retention of C after large cortical ablations depriving C of specific contents. A role of ILN in the perception of primitive sensations is suggested by their afference of directly ascending pathways. A role for ILN in awareness of cortical (...) activity is suggested by their widespread afference from cortex, a property shared with striatum. A role for ILN in volition is suggested by their heavy projection to striatum. Unlike striatum, ILN also project widely to almost all neocortex, enabling an effect on ideation; this last property is in common with other structures but none of them has the same direct cortical afference. And passage through the reticular nucleus of ILN efferents to cortex could impact the attention-selective action of nRt. It is suggested that the quickest route to a better understanding of C involves more intensive study of ILN. No other structure seems, in the light of our current knowledge, a more likely site for Mc. (shrink)

The main idea in this series of essays is that subjective awareness depends upon the intralaminar nuclei of each thalmus. This implies that the internal structure and external relations of ILN make subjective awareness possible. An array of material relevant to this proposal was briefly reviewed in Part I. This Part II considers in more detail some semantic aspects and a bit of philosophic background as these pertain to propositions 0, 1, and 2 of Part I. Part II should be (...) read in conjunction with Part I. (shrink)

Recently, social epistemologists have sought to establish what the governing epistemic relationship should be between novices and experts. In this paper, I argue for, and expand upon, Helen De Cruz’s expert-as-teacher model. For although this model is vulnerable to significant challenges, I propose that a specifically extended version can sufficiently overcome these challenges (call this the “extended-expert-as-teacher” model, or the “EEAT” model). First, I show the respective weaknesses of three influential models in the literature. Then, I argue the expert-as-teacher model (...) can overcome its weaknesses by adding what I call the "Authority Clause", "Advisor Clause", and "Ex Post Facto Clause" of the EEAT model. After developing a robust account of these clauses, I entertain three major objections. First, I respond to the charge that the EEAT model is little better than the expert-as-authority model. Second, I respond to a double-counting objection. Lastly, I respond to a pragmatic objection from complexity. (shrink)

This article grapples with the causes of India’s microfinance crisis. By contrasting Bangladesh’s highly successful Grameen model with the allegedly “universalizable” version of India’s SKS Microfinance, trust or social capital is isolated—not just narrowly interpreted within standard economic theory, but more broadly construed—as the essential element accounting for the early success of microfinance. It is argued that the microfinance experience has been widely misinterpreted, in both analytical and policy terms. This article suggests inherent limits in extending the model to for-profit (...) institutions and, in particular, to the pace of scaling up. (shrink)

The advent of quantum mechanics in the early 20 th Century had profound consequences for science and mathematics, for philosophy (Schrödinger), and for logic (von Neumann). In 1968, Putnam wrote that quantum mechanics required a revolution in our understanding of logic per se. However, applications of quantum logics have been little explored outside the quantum domain. Dummett saw some implications of quantum logic for truth, but few philosophers applied similar intuitions to epistemology or ontology. Logic remained a truth-functional ’science’ of (...) correct propositional reasoning. Starting in 1935, the Franco-Romanian thinker Stéphane Lupasco described a logical system based on the inherent dialectics of energy and accordingly expressed in and applicable to complex real processes at higher levels of reality. Unfortunately, Lupasco’s fifteen major publications in French went unrecognized by mainstream logic and philosophy, and unnoticed outside a Francophone intellectual community, albeit with some translations into other Romance languages. In English, summaries of Lupasco’s logic appeared ca. 2000, but the first major treatment and extension of his system was published in 2008 (see Brenner 2008). This paper is a further attempt to establish Lupasco’s concepts as significant contributions to the history and philosophy of logic, in line with the work of Gödel, general relativity, and the ontological turn in philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The main cause of the crisis was the behavior of the banks—largely a result of misguided incentives unrestrained by good regulation. Conservative ideology, along with unrealistic economic models of perfect information, perfect competition, and perfect markets, fostered lax regulation, and campaign contributions helped the political process along. The banks misjudged risk, wildly overleveraged, and paid their executives handsomely for being short‐sighted; lax regulation let them get away with it—putting at risk the entire economy. The mortgage brokers neglected due diligence, (...) since they would not bear the risk of default once their mortgages had been securitized and sold to others. Others can be blamed: the ratings agencies that judged subprime securities as investment grade; the Fed, which contributed low interest rates; the Bush administration, whose Iraq war and tax cuts for the rich made low interest rates necessary. But low interest rates can be a boon; it was the financial institutions that turned them into a bust. (shrink)

In 1931 eminent chemist Fritz Paneth maintained that the modern notion of “element” is closely related to (and as “metaphysical” as) the concept of element used by the ancients (e.g., Aristotle). On that basis, the element chlorine (properly so-called) is not the elementary substance dichlorine, but rather chlorine as it is in carbon tetrachloride. The fact that pure chemicals are called “substances” in English (and closely related words are so used in other European languages) derives from philosophical compromises made by (...) grammarians in the late Roman Empire (particularly Priscian [fl. ~520 CE]). When the main features of the constitution of isotopes became clear in the first half of the twentieth century, the formal (IUPAC) definition of a “chemical element” was changed. The features that are “essential” to being an element had previously been “transcendental” (“beyond the sphere of consciousness”) but, by the mid-twentieth century the defining characteristics of elements, as such, had come to be understood in detail. This amounts to a shift in a “horizon of invisibility” brought about by progress in chemistry and related sciences. Similarly, chemical insight is relevant to currently-open philosophical problems, such as the status of “the bundle theory” of the coherence of properties in concrete individuals. (shrink)

The work is the presentation of a logical theory - Logic in Reality (LIR) - and of applications of that theory in natural science and philosophy, including ...

The main scientific problems of chemical bonding were solved half a century ago, but adequate philosophical understanding of chemical combination is yet to be achieved. Chemists routinely use important terms ("element," "atom," "molecule," "substance") with more than one meaning. This can lead to misunderstandings. Eliminativists claim that what seems to be a baseball breaking a window is merely the action of "atoms, acting in concert." They argue that statues, baseballs, and similar macroscopic things "do not exist." When macroscopic objects like (...) baseballs move, exceedingly large numbers (1025) of microscopic components coordinate their activities. Understanding how this happens requires attention to the interactions that link parts into larger units. Eliminativists say that everything that truly exists has causal relationships in addition to those of its components—"nonredundant causality." This paper holds that if a number of entities interact in such a way that the effect of that collection on test objects is different than it would have been in the absence of the interaction, then identification of that collection as a single composite agent is warranted, for purposes to which that difference is relevant. Ordinary "chemical substances" (both elementary materials such as dihydrogen and compounds such as water) fulfill this version of the requirement of nonredundant causality. Other sorts of chemical coherences, including chemical dissipative structures (e.g., flames), also fulfill that criterion. All these types of coherences qualify as "substances" (as that term is used in philosophy) even though they are not all "chemical substances.". (shrink)

What, precisely, is `salt'? It is a certainwhite, solid, crystalline, material, alsocalled sodium chloride. Does any of that solidwhite stuff exist in the sea? – Clearly not.One can make salt from sea water easily enough,but that fact does not establish thatsalt, as such, is present in brine. (Paper andink can be made into a novel – but no novelactually exists in a stack of blank paper witha vial of ink close by.) When salt dissolves inwater, what is present is no (...) longer `salt' butrather a collection of hydrated sodium cationsand chloride anions, neither of which isprecisely salt, nor is the collection. Theaqueous material in brine is also significantlydifferent from pure water. Salt may beconsidered to be present in seawater, but onlyin a more or less vague `potential' way.Actually, there is no salt in the sea. In bothancient and modern treatments of otherimportant chemical concepts, including thenotions of `element', related complication,especially polysemy (terms with multiplemeanings), also occurs.In a recent paper, Paul Needham discussed the(predicable) properties of chemical substances,phases, and solutions. He provided a valuablecharacterization of cases in which severalquantities occupy the same space. He alsoconcluded that solution properties are not`intensive', because solvent and solute do nothave parts in common. He tacitly assumed thatingredients are not altered by their inclusionin a solution. This may be the case in somespecial cases (deutero-benzene dissolved inbenzene, say) but is not true in general – andcertainly does not apply to the case of brine,which Needham used as an example – since theions that exist in the solution, and also theaqueous material there, are quite differentfrom the pure ingredients used in making thesolution. An adequate theory of wholes andparts (mereology) must take into account thatwhen individuals enter combinations ofinteresting sorts they no longer are the verysame individuals that existed prior to thecomposition. It appears that no such formaltheory now actually exists. (shrink)

Wegner vacillates between considering the experience of will as a directly-sensed feeling and as a cognitive construct. Most of his book is devoted to examples of erroneous cognition. The brain basis of will as an immediately-sensed emotion receives minimal attention.

Aware of the decline and imminent demise of many integrated steel mills in the United States and fascinated by their monumental architecture, machinery, and the culture of work and community that was inextricably connected to them, Joseph Elliott photographed the mills in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania from 1989 until final shutdown in 1997. This book appeals to the growing fascination with industrial archaeology and will be an inspiration for the preservation and re-use of these relic structures.

Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?

Each of these books presents a new paradigm of nature and couples it with a convincing explanation of how our right brain hemispheres have a unique ability to ...

A report on an international meeting held at Georgetown University on the Philosophy of Chemistry.

While engaging in rich discussion, Conspiracy Theories analyzes current arguments and evidence while providing real-world examples so students can contextualize and visualize the debates. Each chapter addresses important current questions, provides conceptual tools, defines important terms, and introduces the appropriate methods of analysis.

The work of Luciano Floridi lies at the interface of philosophy, information science and technology, and ethics, an intersection whose existence and significance he was one of the first to establish. His closely related concepts of a philosophy of information (PI), informational structural realism, information logic (IL), and information ethics (IE) provide a new ontological perspective from which moral concerns can be addressed, especially but not limited to those arising in connection with the new information and communication technologies. In this (...) paper, I relate Floridi's approach to another novel perspective, namely, that of an extension of logic to complex real processes, including those of information production and transfer. This non-propositional, non-truth-functional logic (logic in reality (LIR)) is grounded in the fundamental dualism (dynamic opposition) inherent in energy and accordingly present at all levels of reality. The LIR description of the dynamics of processes and their evolution is relevant to what Floridi refers to as the possible non-linguistic aspects of information. It suggests answers to some of Floridi's “outstanding problems” in PI related to the ontological status of information and how it is used in cognition. Floridi's IL retains the formal structure of the doxastic and epistemic logics from which he correctly distinguishes it and is the basis for his conceptual PI. However, LIR fulfills Floridi's implied requirement that logic be regarded as a natural phenomenon dealing with other natural phenomena, recovering its original philosophical function. LIR provides a logical foundation for discussion of ethical questions based on kinds of information that complements IL. Both are reconsiderations of logic that, as Marijuan suggests, may be necessary for the advancement of information technology in an ethical direction (cf. also Brenner). IE focuses on entities as constituted by information in an overall strategy that generalizes the concept of moral agents. LIR and its related ontology naturalize critical aspects of Floridi's theses, especially, the moral value of being as such and a non-separable joint responsibility of individuals and groups. I compare IE to other current approaches to ethics and information technology (e.g., phenomenological and social constructivist). Ethical information is defined “ecologically” in process terms as reality in a physical space (cf. Floridi), with an intentional “valence,” positive and negative, in the morally valued interaction between producer and receiver. LIR is neither topic-neutral nor context independent and can support an ethics involving apparently contradictory perspectives (e.g., internalist and externalist). Ethics involves practical reasoning, and unlike standard logics, LIR supports Magnani's approach to abductive reasoning in rational moral decision making. The basis of moral responsibility and the consequent behavior of individuals involved in information and communications technologies is the same logical–metaphysical principle of dynamic opposition instantiated at other levels of reality. The way moral responsibilities are actively accepted (or not) by individuals supervenes on their primitive psychological structure, which in turn reflects an evolutionary development grounded in the fundamental dualism of the physical world. The paper concludes with some suggestions of areas of philosophical research, such as causality, identity, and the ontological turn, where convergence of the Floridi and LIR approaches might be envisaged. Their overall motivation is the same, namely, the development of strategies for reinforcing and increasing ethical sensitivity wherever possible. The ethical information concept outlined in the paper supports the function of IE, assigned to it by Floridi, of potentially determining what is right and what is wrong. (shrink)

Many people believe in the power of positive thinking (i.e., how thoughts and attitude can shape their future) yet, despite a plethora of books on this subject, no previous author has credibly explained how mere thoughts are able to tangibly influence future events. To explain the connection, Dr. Donlan presents a new paradigm of nature coupled with a viable explanation of how our right cerebral hemisphere has evolved circuitry that can tap into the hidden domain of the metaphysical. To support (...) this premise, he exposes the reader to the worlds of physics, metaphysics, brain architecture, and evolution. Donlan then introduces the many problems associated with the current model and contrasts it with a new view which remedies many of the issues facing theoretical physicists today. Important to its central theme, the book's proposed paradigm supports the remarkable notion that the future can only be created with thoughts. In the final analysis, the author brings his readers through the necessary steps to put this knowledge to work to help them (pre)ordain their own realities. (shrink)

Nature abounds in compound individuals. Discrete, functioning entities are made up of components which are, in some sense, also individuals. Scientists sometimes need to be concerned with whether aggregates (e.g.. species of plants) or components (e.g., quarks) exist. but such questions are not generally regarded as having great importance for science. It has often happened, however, that scientific developments have had major significance for subsequent philosophical discussion of problems of the one and the many. Recently, there has been considerable increase (...) in scientific understanding of spontaneous development of spatial and temporal organization (structure) in physical. chemical, and biological systems. In an earlier note (PS 11:35), I suggested that this progress in science raises points that may be helpful in dealing with a question of current importance for process philosophy. This paper provides support for that suggestion. The first section introduces the philosophical problem. The middle sections provide brief non-technical introduction to scientific concepts. The final section combines both topics. (shrink)

The Ashgate Research Companion to Islamic Law. Edited by Rudolph Peters and Peri Bearman. Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2014. Pp. x + 345. $149.95, £95.

Why study Aḥmad al-Ghazali -- Initiatic influence -- Literary influence -- Studies on Aḥmad al-Ghazali -- The goal of this book -- Sources for the Aḥmad al-Ghazali tradition -- The life and times of Aḥmad al-Ghazali -- Aḥmad al-Ghazali's spiritual practice -- The roots of Aḥmad al-Ghazali's teachings -- Aḥmad al-Ghazali's metaphysics of love -- Conclusion.

While it is common to think that neuroscientists are proponents of basic emotions theory, this is not necessarily the case. My ideas, for example are more aligned with cognitive than basic emotions theories.

The conjunction of process and reality is familiar from the original theory of A. N. Whitehead and the subsequent development of process philosophy and metaphysics by Nicholas Rescher. Classical logic, however, is either ignored or stated to be inappropriate to a discussion of process. In this paper, I will show that the value of a process view of reality can be enhanced by reference to a new, transconsistent logic of reality that is grounded in the physical properties of energy in (...) its various forms. These properties justify a principle of dynamic antagonism or opposition that explicates the phenomena of change at all levels of reality. It can be, accordingly, a preferred logic for understanding the dynamics of real processes. (shrink)

Although sexual antagonism may have played a role in forming some sex chromosome systems, there appears to be little empirical or theoretical justification in assuming that it is the driving force in all cases of sex chromosome evolution. In many species, sex chromosomes have diverged in size and shape through the accumulation of mutations in regions of suppressed recombination. It is commonly assumed that recombination is suppressed in sex chromosomes due to selection to resolve sexually antagonistic pleiotropy. However, the requirement (...) for a sex chromosome‐specific mechanism for suppressing recombination is questionable, since more general models of recombination suppression on autosomes also appear to be applicable to sex chromosomes. Direct tests of the predictions of the sexual antagonism hypothesis offer only limited support in specific sex chromosome systems and circumstantial evidence remains open to interpretation. (shrink)